Montana Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 2 Spring 1962

Article 1

January 1962

Publication of the Names of Juvenile Felons
Gilbert Geis
Associate Professor of Sociology, Los Angeles State College

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Gilbert Geis, Publication of the Names of Juvenile Felons, 23 Mont. L. Rev. (1961).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol23/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Geis: Publication of the Names of Juvenile Felons

Publication of the Names of Juvenile Felons
By GILBERT GEIS*
In 1961, the Montana legislature approved a statute allowing newspaper publication of the name of any youth proceeded against as, or found
to be, a delinquent child where a hearing or proceeding is had in the
juvenile court on a written petition charging him with the commission of
any felony.' This statute, directly altering the previous approach in the
state,' varies in degree and kind from the laws of most juvenile courts both
in the United States and throughout the world. It also stands in sharp
contrast to the procedures recommended by standard-setting committees
composed of judges and other individuals concerned with the most effective
approach to the problem of juvenile delinquency. Neither its uniqueness
nor its opposition to prevailing standards necessarily means that the Montana statute is ill-conceived, of course, but they do suggest that it deserves
rather close scrutiny. It is the purpose of the present paper to provide
such scrutiny, and to attempt to marshall relevant material which might
suggest the assets and demerits of a law such as that now in force in Montana.
It can be misleading to interpret the new Montana statute without
reference to another unique aspect of the state's procedure in dealing with
delinquents. The Montana juvenile court code provides that all offenders
beyond the age of sixteen who commit one of a rather large number of
enumerated offenses automatically come within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the adult criminal court.' This provision, enacted after a rough legislative
journey,' varies sharply from the law in other jurisdictions and from the
standards of the Advisory Council of Judges of the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency. The Council only recently re-emphasized its
strong commitment to the view that "the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
properly extends to all children under the age of eighteen."' Transfer of
juvenile court jurisdiction to adult criminal courts, the Council of Judges
insists, should be undertaken only for acts which would be felonies if corn*Associate Professor of Sociology, Los Angeles State College. A.B. 1947, Colgate
University; Ph.D. 1953, University of Wisconsin.
'Laws of Mont. 1961, ch. 132, § 2.
"Prior to the 1961 amendment, the statute provided: "No publicity shall be given to
any matter or proceeding in the juvenile court involving children proceeded against
as, or found to be, delinquent children." REvisn CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 10-633.
(Hereinafter, REvIsED CoDEs OF MONTANA will be cited R.C.M.)
•..a child over the age of sixteen (.16) years who commits or attempts to commit
murder, manslaughter, assault in the first degree, robbery, first or second degree
burglary while having in his possession a deadly weapon, and carrying a deadly
weapon or weapons with intent to assault, shall not be proceeded against as a
juvenile delinquent but shall be prosecuted in the criminal courts in accordance
with the provisions of the criminal laws of this state governing the offenses above
listed." R.C.M. 1947, § 10-602(b). See State ew rel. Bresnahan v. District Court,
127 Mont. 310, 263 P.2d 968 (1953) ; State ex rel. Ostoj v. McClernan, 129 Mont.
160, 284 P.2d 252 (1955) ; State ez rel. Dahl v. District Court, 134 Mont. 395, 333
P.2d 495 (1958) ; State ez rel. Keast v. District Court, 136 Mont. 367, 348 P.2d 135
(1959).

'State ex rel. Keast v. District Court, 136 Mont. 367, 373-74, 348 P.2d 136, 138 (1959).
5Advisory Council of Judges, Transfer of Ca8e8 Between Juvenile and Criminal
Courts-A Policy Statement, 8 CRIME & DELIN. 3 (1962). (Italics supplied.)
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mitted by adults, and only after a full investigation, a hearing, and a clear
finding that "the advantage in resources for treatment and public safety
lies with the criminal court rather than the juvenile court."
The Judges
reject seriousness of the offense as a valid criterion for categoric transfer,
and it is apparent that they feel that transfers should be made rarely and
then only for strongly compelling reasons.
In terms of the mandatory provision in Montana for district court
jurisdiction over the more serious offenses committed by juveniles beyond
the age of sixteen, the new statute concerning the publication of the names
of juvenile court participants can be seen to apply specifically to persons
below sixteen who commit felonies and to those between sixteen and
eighteen who commit felonies which do not fall within the purview of the
adult court. So viewed, the content and intent of the new law and its
deviation from generally accepted juvenile court procedures and standards
stands out more starkly.
LEGAL AND SOCIAL STANDARDS
The Law: Juvenile Courts and Juvenile Publicity
Whether or not the names of persons appearing before the juvenile
court shall be published in newspapers is clearly a matter of legislative prerogative. The 1899 Illinois law which initially gave endorsement to the
principles which underlie all of our juvenile court statutes was aimed at
separating juveniles from adults, and giving to the former a benevolent
form of adjudication and disposition.' This procedure was to be so enlightened and so benign that there would exist no conflict between the best
interests of the juvenile and the actions of the juvenile court in determining these interests. There would therefore be no reason for the juvenile
to require protection against arbitrary and ill-considered action: the
rule-of-thumb about places of perdition and good intentions was presumed
inapplicable in regard to the new juvenile courts.
It must be remembered, though, that while it is often re-iterated that
juveniles are not entitled to constitutional protections,' his situation operates only within a limited context. All rules of fair process and reasonable procedure cannot be discarded. Actions taken against the juvenile
which are patently opposed to his best interests and the best interests of
the society (e.g., vicious forms of punishment) would undoubtedly draw
the censure of the appellate courts. There must also be at least some semblance of procedural regularity and formality. A juvenile could hardly be
legally institutionalized on the basis of an anonymous letter sent to a judge,
without the juvenile's appearance in court, without a petition, a probation
report, and similar proceedings.
What seems true of the juvenile court, then, in relation to constitutional provisions, is that the rote citation of these rights will not carry
weight with an appellate court unless it can be soundly demonstrated on
6

Id. at 5.
'Laws
of Illinois, 1899, p. 131-37.
8
See, e.g. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954) ; State exxrel. Palagi v.
Freeman, 81 Mont. 132, 140, 262 Pac. 168, 170-171 (1927).
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corollary grounds that the elimination of any particular right offends a
sense of justice and works to the detriment of the juvenile.' Juveniles
rarely will be able to claim such things as the right to a jury trial, or to a
grand jury indictment, or to many of the other standard procedures of the
adult criminal court with much hope of success unless these guarantees are
spelled out by statute. Since the constitutionality of the juvenile court
has never been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States,
it is possible to speculate, as Professor Francis Allen has, that juvenile
court procedures "may one day present a series of difficult and arresting
issues for the Court's consideration.'"' But the recent decision in Pee v.
United States seems to indicate that the juvenile court approach is acceptable in its broad outlines to the upper echelons of the federal judicial
hierarchy and very likely to the highest court.1
The constitutional guarantee of a public trial, appearing in the Sixth
Amendment, is therefore not of direct relevance for the operation of the
juvenile court except as a vague and hazy signpost around which a detour
may be taken if a better road can be found. Only a few court decisions
have been concerned with the matter of publicity in juvenile court hearings, and these have held that laws which insist upon private court sessions
are adequate forms of legislation. In Dendy v. Wilson," for instance, the
provision in the Texas Juvenile Delinquency Act allowing for the exclusion
of the public from juvenile court hearings was sustained with the following
logic:
.. . This saves the minor from embarrassment, and also permits
the court to avoid publicity that often surrounds the trial of a
case. Since the proceedings under this Act must be governed
largely by rules governing civil actions, the trial court did not err
in excluding the general public from the trial.'
Further support for private juvenile court hearings derives from a
Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
"The constitutional safeguards vouchsafed a juvenile in [juvenile court] proceedings are determined from the requirements of due process and fair treatment,
and not by the direct application of the clauses of the Constitution which in terms
apply to criminal cases." 274 F.2d at 559. In an appendix to the case, the court
lists state and federal authorities sustaining this proposition. 274 F.2d at 563.
On the proposition that juvenile court proceedings "are not criminal cases"
(274 F.2d at 559), the court finds support in decisions from 42 states and statutes
in the other eight. 274 F.2d at 559, n. 12. These authorities are collected in an appendix to the case. 274 F.2d at 561.
'°Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice,
8 DE PAUL L. Rr v. 213, 233 (1959). In one side allusion both to the juvenile court
and to the question under discussion here, Justice Black referred to the fact that
" . . Whatever may be the classification of juvenile court proceedings, they are
often conducted without admitting the public." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 n.12
(1948).
"Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 558-60 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
12Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
8Id., 179 S.W.2d at 274. Cf. White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; Cinque
v. Boyd, 99 Conn 70, 121 Atl. 678 (1923) ; In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563
(1908) ; State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So. 2d 242 (1951) ; In re Mont., 175 Pa.
Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954) ; In re Lewis, 51 Wash. 2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957) ;
Land v. State, 101 Ga. App. 448, 114 S.E.2d 165 (1960). Cf. the comment that "It
is quite apparent that the legislative intent was that juvenile matters are to be
treated [in Montana] as civil and not as criminal proceedings." State er rel. Ostoj
v. McClernan, 129 Mont. 160, 164, 284 P.2d 252, 264 (1955).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1961

3

Montana MONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
23 [1961],
Iss. 2, Art. 1
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 23,

wide range of situations in which justice is conducted beyond the eyes and
ears of the mass media of communication. Grand jury hearings are traditionally private," and the press is regularly excluded in some jurisdictions
from attending or reporting upon trials dealing with treasonable or particularly obscene material.' Montana is one of six states which insists that
the public, including the press, be forbidden admittance to preliminary
Many states enforce
hearings if the defendant demands this exclusion.
Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and forbid the intrusion of
photographic equipment and television cameras into the courtroom situation," and, in a cognate vein, several states refuse to allow the publication
of the names of victims of sexual offenses on the ground that such publication serves no useful social purpose and might further injure the victim."
Th4 right to a public trial and to the publication of one's name and,
presumably, to the publication of the details of the state's allegation and
the defendant's rebuttal is well established for almost all phases of adult
criminal proceedings, and isconsidered a virtually impregnable ingredient
of the adult's arsenal of constitutional protections. As we have seen, denial
of both elements of this right to a juvenile will be sustained, with support
based on the presumed compact by which the state provides protective social
procedures for the juvenile in return for the elimination of criminal due
process. Judge Orman W. Ketcham has argued with considerable vigor
that "if the state has failed to keep its legislative promises - the circumvention of constitutional protections and -the assertion of state control in
the name of parens patriae are neither legally nor morally justified. "'
This viewpoint is not directly applicable to the Montana situation concerning publicity, however, for here we have a statute corresponding to the
adult situation which may in fact be detrimental to the expressed aim of
the juvenile court code. No juvenile has yet claimed that a mandatory
public trial and the publication of the details of his behavior in the mass
media violates the spirit of the juvenile court bill of rights. It would be
an interesting and provocative viewpoint, however unlikely it might be to
succeed on appeal.
Juvenile Court Publicity in the United States
There is no common legislative agreement in this country concerning
the most efficacious method of dealing with the question of public trials
for juveniles and the publication of the names of persons involved in such
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-6324, -6325.
YContra, State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080 (1916), but note dissent by
Sanner, J., at 219, 156 Pac. at 1084.
1
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6110. Cf. People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 354 P.2d 225 (1960)
(right that all unauthorized persons be excluded from the courtroom is mandatory).
Gels, Preliminary Hearings and the Press, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rgv. 397 (1961).
"B.g., State v. Sharpe, 122 S.E. 2d 622 (S.C. 1961) ; Geis, Canon 85 in the Light of
Recent Events, 43 A.B.A.J. 419 (1957).
'8WIs. STAT. § 942.02 (1958) ; State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948)
(statute is constitutional) ; FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1959). See also Brumfield v. State,
108 So. 2d 33, 36 (Fla. 1959) (court order prohibiting photographing indicted rapist
on way to arraignment is valid).
"See R.C.M. 1947, § 10-601 for the construction and purpose of the Montana juvenile
court act.
"'Ketcham, The Unfulfffled Proni8e of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DEzINQ. 97,
101 (1961).
1
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proceedings. This lack of consensus may be traced either to disagreements
on the end being sought by the legislative enactment or uncertainty as to
the relationship between stipulated ends and the methods most effectively
related to their achievement. Even granting, however, that agreement could
be reached concerning both the desired ends and the relevant means to
achieve these ends, it is obvious that some choice would have to be made
among the ends and some hierachy established regarding their importance.
A majority of the states in the United States - 30 in all - have no
law directly prohibiting the publication either of juvenile court proceedings or the names of delinquents, but leave the matter to the discretion of
the court. Thirteen states have no laws by which the publication of material concerning juvenile court cases could be prohibited, while five states
directly forbid the publication of the names of youths before the court."
Georgia, like Montana, takes a unique stand. By the terms of a 1957
statute, it makes mandatory the release by the juvenile court of the names
of second or subsequent offenders appearing before the court."
The situation in those states which provide discretionary rules concerning publication varies widely, ranging from a total absence of the use of
juvenile court material to a rather liberal circulation of such data. In discretionary states, a great number of judges, probably a large majority,
abdicate responsibility on this point and leave to the judgment of the newspapers the question of whether or not they will print material from the
juvenile court and the form in which they will use such material. A few
quotations from newspapermen will serve to show how they vary in their
interpretations on this matter. The editor of a newspaper with a 20,000
circulation writes:
Generally, we believe youngsters should be given every opportunity to go straight, and that publicity on early errors might
make the road very difficult.'
Another newspaper editor operates under the following rule-of-thumb procedure:
Our editorial policy extends consideration to juveniles, not on
a hard and fast rule bui subject to the circumstances. As general
practice we withhold juvenile names in the interest of their rehabilitation on first offenses. Major crimes or chronic offenses
(three) call for publication of names."
Finally, a third newspaper editor notes:
When six boys-

all 16-

stole 72 cars, we used all their

names, but when four boys - 12 to 13 - broke into an abandoned
television station in their first offense, we printed no names. Generally, if they are over 14 and are prosecuted, they are going to
get their names in the paper.'
"Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, General Management Bulletin 30-31 (Feb. 19,
1958).
toGA. CODE ANN. § 24-2432 (1959).
nAm. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, op. cit. supra note 21 at 29.
"Ibid.

"U.P.I. Reporter, July 31, 1958, p. 2.
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The preceding quotations illustrate the use by the editors of their own
social conscience before they arrive at decisions on whether or not to publish
the names of juveniles. As a matter of public policy, it seems questionable
that the best procedure is to assign to a private, profit-seeking enterprise,
such as the press, the final decision on a matter which concerns the wellbeing of the juvenile, whom the legislature has chosen to protect by special
procedural rules, and the well-being of the entire society. Aside from the
fact that newspapers might well be swayed by matters of circulation" as
well as by delicate relationships within the community, their personnel are
not ideally trained for this exercise of discretion. In addition, the public
has little recourse against decisions with which it might not be in agreement, particularly as the press moves toward a position of monopoly in most
American communities.'
Foreign Approaches to Juvenile Publicity
The spread of American-style juvenile delinquency into foreign countries raises some very basic questions concerning the functional utility of
juvenile behavior, and discussions concerning publicity must be turned back
onto the problem of the role that such publicity might play in terms of the
dynamics originally evoking delinquency. Despite the fulminations of a
large number of European adults against what they consider to be the
debasement of their cultural standards by American values, these values
have made a deep imprint upon foreign youth. Even in a culture so controlled as that of the Soviet Union, the "hooligans" or stalyagi represent
a prominent and disturbing segment of the youth population, notorious
in their rejection of the dominant motifs of the ruling and respectable
classes. Querulously, one Soviet authority has been quoted as raising what
is perhaps the most basic question surrounding -the worldwide proliferation
of delinquent behavior and the forsaking of traditional values. "What
kind of ideals were they," he asks, "that they were so easy to lose?' '
If delinquency itself, at least in its outward and superficial manifestations if not in its causal roots, represents an American export, so too does
the juvenile court movement constitute an American product. Following
the Illinois lead near the turn of the century, Great Britain adopted a
juvenile court law in 1908; France, Australia, and Belgium in 1912; Hungary in 1913; Spain in 1918; and Germany in 1923.' In virtually all of
these countries, juvenile court proceedings are surrounded by a cloak of
anonymity. '
The English situation is rather typical and is indicative of the rationale
behind the policy of non-publication of identifying data concerning juvenile
'"One law professor has observed cynically that "juvenile delinquency has become a
major factor in the American economy. Without it, many newspapers might have
to go into receivership." Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration, 34 N.Y.U.L.
Rgv. 83, 113 (1959).
2
See LIEBLING, PRESS (1961).
2Salisbury, "Lost Generation" Baffles Soviet; Nihilistic Youths Shun Ideology, N.Y.

Times, Feb. 9, 1962, pp. 1, 4, col. 5.
2Tappan & Nicolle, Juvenile Delinquents and their Treatment, 339 ANNALS 157, 160
(1962).

'See Smith, Juvenile Court Laws in Foreign Countries, CHILD. Bun. PUB. No. 328
(1951). See e.g., Millo, Juvenile Delinquency in Israel, in CHILD & YoUTH WELFARE
IN ISRAEL 245, 252 (Smilansky et. al. ed. 1960).
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offenders. In Britain, the juvenile court adheres more closely than in the
United States to the legalistic procedures of adult criminal adjudication.
The original 1908 English law granted admittance to the juvenile courts
to bona fide representatives of the press, while barring the general public,
and attempted to negotiate informally with the newspapers to keep the
names of juveniles from their columns.' Reviewing this situation, a 1927
committee recommended that the informal approach be replaced by mandatory non-disclosure legislation,' and this recommendation was included
in the 1933 juvenile court law.' At present, the English permit newspaper
representatives in the juvenile courts but forbid them to reveal the identity
of the accused delinquent unless either the court or the Secretary of State
(Home Department) believes that such a move would be in the interests of
justice.
This last provision is almost never invoked and on the few occasions
that it is used it may become subject to pointed inquiry and criticism.
When, for instance, the Evening Standard was permitted in 1960 to print
the name of a 13-year-old girl who had been absent from home for seven
weeks until discovered in London because, according to the court, "we
think it will be a lesson to girls who may be tempted to behave in a similar
way," one English legal periodical noted critically that the judge's statement was among "the strangest reasons given for revelation.'
The recent report of the Ingleby committee, in evaluating the British
approach to the publication of the names of juveniles found it satisfactory
and recommended its continuation. The Committee also indicated a desire
to see that appellate hearings involving juveniles protect their identity.
On the other hand, the Committee concluded that anonymity should not be
extended to juveniles tried in adult courts. These persons, the Committee
maintained, are "for the most part those charged with the more serious
offences and the arguments for protecting children from publicity apply
less strongly to them.'
Despite this exception, it is clear that the English
law keeps private the identity of a very large number of juvenile offenders
-possibly 90 to 95 percent of such offenders-who would not be so treated
under Montana law.
Standards Relating to Juvenile Publicity
No policy-setting group favors a procedure of mandatory disclosure of

the names of juveniles such as that followed by the Montana statute. There
is general agreement that the press, as in England, should be admitted to
the juvenile court hearing and that the public, except as it has a most direct
8Children's Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 67, § 111 (4).
'Departmental Committee on the Treatment of Young Offenders, CMD. 2831 (1927),
p. 237.
'Children and Young Person's Act, 1933, Stat. 23 Geo. 5, c. 1, § 49.
"Juveniles and Publicity, 124 JUST. P. 585 (1960). The same periodical notes three
types of occasions on which juvenile court publicity might be warranted: 1) in
order to get witnesses to come forward; 2) in cases of indecent assault; and 3)
to show how the juvenile court operates. Juveniles and Publicity, 122 JUST. P. 628
(1958).
'Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons, CMD. 1191, (1960), pp.
80-82. See also, Gels, Juvenile Justice: Great Britain and California, 7 CRsim &
DELINq. 111 (1961).
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interest in the case, should be denied access to juvenile court hearings. Some
variations exists, however, on how much freedom the newspapers should
be afforded to make use of material relating to the identity of juveniles taking part in the hearings.
The 1959 revision of the Standard Juvenile Court Act, prepared by the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency and endorsed by the United
States Children's Bureau, gives discretion to the juvenile court judge in
this matter, noting: "The name or picture of any child subject to the
jurisdiction of the court shall not be made public by any medium of public
information except as authorized by order of the court."'
Support for
privacy appears in a comment stressing that the purpose of the provision
"is to prevent the humiliation and demoralizing effect of publicity or unnecessary disclosure of private affairs heavily charged with feelings of
anxiety, guilt, and recrimination. Disclosure would make it more difficult
for the court to utilize a child's feeling of self-respect in effecting rehabilitation."'
The comment on the Act also notes that "the attention
gained by publicity may propel the sophisticated, aggressive and 'hardened' delinquent into further delinquent acts out of a desire for more recognition. '
Though not included within the Standard Act, there has been some
argument for a provision making mandatory a public trial in the juvenile
court in the event that the juvenile makes such a demand.'
Presumably
the public trial would also include publication of details concerning it. The
apparent contradiction between such a position and a stand inveighing
against publicity as generally detrimental to the juvenile raises some questions, though none of them seem to undermine severely the desirability of
such an approach. Few juveniles would likely insist on public trials, and
those who did would not likely do so for reasons of personal aggrandizement, but rather to call to the attention of the public some element of their
position which they thought was inequitable. The possible harm inherent
in the right to a public trial on demand seems more than compensated for
in the corrective potential of such a provision on the activities of a juvenile
court otherwise unequivocally screened from public view.'
The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges has disagreed with the
Standard Act's program concerning the publication of the names of juvenile
court participants, preferring to leave such publication to the discretion
"Standara Juvenile Court Act, § 33(d) (1959). Reprinted, 5 NPPA JNrL. 323, 386
(1959).
'Ibid.
TId. at 387. Essentially the same approach is advocated in Standards for Specialized Courts Dealing with Children, CHILO. BuR. PUB. No. 346 (1954), p. 98. A resolution favoring such a procedure was adopted by the 1957 Nat'l Inst. on Crime &
Delinquency with the assertion that "such one-shot answers as publishing names,
punishing of parents and 'getting tough' have failed." N.Y. Times, July 17, 1957.
'Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 101, 126
(1958) ; Antean, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CoRNHFL L.Q. 387,
398-399 (1961).
"°Such a procedure would somewhat overcome Paulsen's stricture. "An open trial
would operate as a check on arbitrary action by the court," he writes, "but the
advantage would be purchased at the expense of punishing the juvenile by publicity.
The goals of protecting a young person from the misconduct of his youth, and of
informing the community how its courts operate in every case, cannot be pursued
simultaneously." Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV.
547, 560 (1957).
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of the newspapers themselves on the basis of "voluntary cooperative understandings with the courts" and in line with the traditional policy of the
[Council] that the names of children and other material which would serve
to identify children and families involved be withheld from publication, as
such information is damaging to the child and his family, and contravenes
the humane philosophy of juvenile court laws, without contributing to the
prevention or correction of juvenile delinquency.""
T'he gap between the rationale for non-publication and the mild means
taken to achieve this end by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges
may be interpreted either as a deep feeling that interference with the press's
right to self-determination is undesirable or as a belief that the press, as
a powerful element in the community, and in the judge's work in that community, should not be alienated by any procedure which might serve to stir
its enmity, or perhaps as a combination of these two items. The likelihood
of the rapprochement interpretation being at least partly correct is shown
by recent California events. There, the Governor's Commission on Juvenile
Justice, after a field survey of the juvenile court practices in the state's
58 counties, strongly criticized the free-wheeling dispensation to the press
of juvenile court information, but in its recommendations left it to the
goodwill and discretion of the press whether or not the identity of juvenile
court participants would be disclosed." The explanation for this apparent
default on the part of the Commission in implementing more directly its
findings and its ethos, informal conversations indicate, was a reluctance to
incur the enmity of the newspapers and thus possibly to jeopardize the entire range of proposals in order to gain what was considered to be a somewhat peripheral concession. Thus, the power of the press, exerted so uniformly and on occasion so raucously against juvenile delinquency, may itself be one of the factors serving to abet the very phenomenon it so deplores.
PUBLIC OPINION
Public Opinion Concerning Publicity
Public reactions to juvenile delinquency clearly take the form of demands for sterner treatment of offenders. Few days pass without some
voice calling for an end to the mollycoddling and indulgent treatment allegedly accorded delinquents. It is presumed, in the face of historic evidence to the contrary, that the woodshed approach to juvenile misbehavior
would effectively control such misbehavior. Laments are also put forward
concerning the presumed deterioration of the family and the decline of
such cultural forces as religion, trends which are said to be related to the
reported increase in delinquency.'
Few critics of the present cultural
scene seriously attempt to indicate how the putative gaps in standards are
to be filled; how, for instance, divorces are to avoided, mothers made to stop
working, and religious ethics to be deeply implanted in youth. And, even
"Standard Juvenile Court Act § 33(d) (1959). Reprinted, 5 NPPA JNL. 323, 387
(1959).
"Governor's Special Study Comin'n on Juvenile Justice, pt. 1, p. 24, (1960).
"Notable in this respect is the peculiar explanatory silence concerning the relative
drop of 3 percent in juvenile delinquency during 1959, and the absence of theoretical

and common-sense views to account for this decline.
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granting the remote possibility of such basic alterations, even fewer critics
have been able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of serious students of delinquency that such changes in the social fabric would deter juvenile misbehavior.
The absence of mature, empirical insight and the tendency to depend
upon the exorcism of single items as the answer to a problem as complex
as delinquency seems to pervade much of public opinion. Despite widespread public agreement concerning many alleged contributing factors to
delinquency (e.g., the family), there is an apparent lack of consensus concerning the role that newspaper publication of the names of delinquents
should play in programs to control their behavior. Thus, while a national
survey of young people in 1957 found that 90 percent of a sample of 5,000
persons thought that the penalties imposed on delinquents were not harsh
enough, the panel divided 48 percent to 41 percent, with 11 percent not
replying, on the question of publicizing the names of delinquents, leading
the poller to note that "the division on the printing of names was closer
than on any similar study we have made.""
Adults, in contrast to youngsters, appear to lean more heavily toward
printing the names of delinquents, according to the mail responses of a national weekly that conducted a write-in poll on the matter. Two out of
three persons responding to the question, "Should newspapers print the
names of all youngsters under 18 who run afoul of the law?" believed that
they should. More intriguing than these results, perhaps, was the finding
that five out of six respondents believed that juvenile court judges should
not be given the power to decide which names should be published, though,
as we have seen, this practice prevails in the United States. The reasons
most often advanced by the respondents against judicial discretion were
that "judges were inclined to be lenient, that they were subject to pressures allowing for favoritism, and that favoritism violated democratic principles.'"" The major difficulty with the survey, however, is that it tapped
the opinions only of those persons interested in responding to an open newspaper query, thereby providing considerable reason to suspect that persons
answering fall a long way from resembling the "average" person in the
society. That the survey respondents may represent the more articulate
segments, however, merits some consideration, since this is the segment
which often is most effective in molding its predilections into statutory
form.
Some light on the state of a limited, stratified range of public opinion
in Montana concerning juvenile court publicity was provided by a survey
undertaken by students of journalism at Montana State University in Missoula. The responses showed a wide range of reactions, closely tied in most
instances to the individual's profession or vocation. Newspaper editors and
policemen were overwhelmingly in favor of publication of juveniles' names;
judges, clergymen, and high school students were about evenly divided;
while county attorneys strongly favored the law, now repealed, which prohibited publicity."
"Norman (Okla.) Transcript, April 25, 1957.
"Richardson, Does Publicity Curb Delitiquency?, Family Weekly, July 27, 1958, pp.
5-7 ; Oct. 19, 1958, pp. 4, 13.
"Zahler, Gilluly, James, Katsuta, & Guenin, Juvenile Names in Crime New8, JOURNALIsM REv. 27-32 (Spring 1960).
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The Hoover Crusade
The views of J. Edgar Hoover, chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, carry with them a strong aura of legitimacy, emerging as they do
from his almost 38 years of identification with the highly-regarded law
enforcement agency. It must be realized, however, that Hoover and his
Bureau deal with the juvenile problem primarily in terms of auto thefts
,ind of reports arriving at their headquarters from local police departments.
Hoover has called the problem of delinquency a "monster of frightening
proportions" involving "youthful punks who defy the law." Parents
who inflict vicious offspring on their fellow men "deserve to feel the sting
of public indignation." To deal with the problem, Hoover notes that "a
valuable ally in the fight against crime, the news media of the nation can
afford further public service in focusing the spotlight of public opinion on
those members of the judiciary who, in the face of the present crisis, persist
in endangering the public by unleashing young terrorists apprehended at
great risk by law enforcement officers." The campaign against delinquents
"must include publishing their names and crimes for public information.''
Judge Prettyman, author of the Pee decision,' both summarizes and
takes mild issue with this position in the observation that "Hoover
whom I so greatly admire, becomes positively emotional, even lyrical, when
he discusses this group of young brigands. .

.

. [But not] every teenager

who violates a law is a hoodlum. Most of these transgressing youngsters
are not hoodlums or criminals at all."'
Some hesitation should always be present in accepting categorically
any viewpoint as impassioned as that constantly propounded by Hoover.
It shows particular shortcomings, it seems, in its failure to look beyond the
allegedly vicious propensities of the offender into any configuration of
causative items, and its rather simplistic faith that tough treatment will
deter crime, a faith that should have been rudely shaken by incessant lessons from the history of criminal law.' Criminals are labelled by Hoover
as "scum from the boiling pot of the underworld" and "vermin in human
form . . . spewed out of prison cells to continue their slaughter."

Ad-

vocates of current trends in the field of corrections are often grouped
among those "sentimental yammerheads" and "moronic adults" who show
"asinine behavior" and "maudlin sentiment " and "inherent criminal worship." These persons, are supported by the "moo-cow sentimentalities"
of "hoity-toity professors.''' Tlhe intensity of the Hoover polemic, while
not necessarily undermining its accuracy, seems to provide strong grounds
for wary evaluation of its merits rather than for uncritical acceptance. The
views must also be recognized as characteristic police reactions to law violators, and it should be stressed that there are many persons who are not yet
ready to concede that the police possess any monopoly on deep, thoroughgoing, and sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of criminal behavior, and who believe that the police may, in fact, by virtue of their
"'Quoted in

Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 1959.
"Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
"Prettyman, Three Modern Problems in Criminal Law, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 187,
193-4 (1961).
'See, e.g., ScoTr, HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT passim. (1950).

mEditorial, 28 J. Cnim. L., C., & P.S. 627 (1938).
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vested interests be misled into something other than a dispassionate and
balanced appraisal of such behavior.
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing pages have attempted to establish the legal status of the
question concerning the publication of the names of delinquents. Additional information has been presented bearing upon the practices here and
abroad and the attitudes of various organizations, individuals, and the general public toward such procedures. In the final analysis, it is evident
that the policy pursued by the legislature lies within its discretion and its
comprehension of and sympathy toward alternative courses of action. At
the heart of the matter lie two issues. One is empirical: It seeks to determine what occurs when various approaches are employed? The second question involves a value judgment: In terms of the consequences of alternative policies, which set of conditions does the society desire to produce?
These final pages will be addressed to the foregoing questions.
Publicity and Social Protection
A major reason advanced for the publication of the names of offending delinquents is that such publication puts the community on guard
against further depredations by the youths. A family may come to know
the boy in its neighborhood involved in a rape offense and thus warn a
daughter against having anything to do with this individual. It was in
terms such as these that the newspaper industry expressed its concern with
the proposed Youth Court Act passed in New York in 1956, and managed
to secure postponement of its inauguration for five years and eventually
to bring about its repeal. The president of the New York State Society of
Newspaper Editors, for instance, warned that "you and I have a right to
know the marauders in our neighborhood" and stressed that "you may
never know if you live next door to a criminal. "'
It is notable that this argument offers no hope of protection to the
community at large, but only to those elements within it which see and act
upon the information imparted by the press. It is not alleged that the delinquent will not commit a subsequent offense, but only that some members of the community may prevent that offense being committed in terms
of persons or things important to them. This hardly seems to be an appealing policy, but rather represents a social lottery. The delinquent behavior is not deterred, but merely channeled elsewhere.
The social protection allegedly forthcoming through this approach
seems both short-sighted and illusory. Few persons today believe that
narcotic addicts, for instance, can be kept from using heroin by the aversion and scorn of their immediate neighbors. It is quite conceivable that
such scorn might well aggravate the individual to further acts directed
against those whom he sees as judging and rejecting him. While this pattern will assuredly not always ensue, it seems reasonable to believe that
it will eventuate often enough to make the protection the community desires a mere chimera. Most important, actually, is the fact that the best
"N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1957.
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protection to the community is not the immediate identification of the
juvenile malefactor so that he can be shunned, but the reform of the offender so that he can be trusted. Constant vigilance may be the price of
eternal security, but it is a high price, and in the area of delinquency at
least, probably an unrealistic one which should not be paid unless other
procedures are inadequate.
The complaint of some youths that they themselves are indiscriminately labeled delinquents because of the anonymity afforded their violating
brethren seems to be rather specious. Sailors will continue to be scorned
because some of their shipmates behaved less well than a community desired,
and Negroes will suffer discrimination even though a comparatively small
number may fit the stereotype that the majority group has seized upon to
justify its bigotry. It would not help if deviating sailors or offending
Negroes were identified for public consumption but only if basic attitudes
toward these groups were altered. Teen-agers will continue to reap the
general attitudes and opinions in the society about them whether or not
particular delinquents are singled out for newspaper identification. In
fact, it might well be hypothesized that the more that individual delinquents
are identified, the more the public attitude toward all teen-agers as real or
potential delinquents will be reinforced.
Publicity and Individual Deterrence
Basically, the aim of any social policy attempting to deal with delinquency is to deter further behavior of this type. Plato's age-old injunction
has contemporary relevance. "He who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has
regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and
he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He
punishes for the sake of prevention.'
Deterrence may be accomplished
in a wide range of ways, but many of the methods (for example, widegpread and indiscriminate capital punishment for delinquents) are offensive to more basic values within our society.
It needs continually to be stressed in dealing with delinquency that it
is but one of a large number of problems within a highly complex society
such as ours, and that social policies aimed at controlling or eliminating it
must always take into account the total implications involved in their operation. For instance, it has been stressed that Italy has a comparatively low
delinquency rate, and at least one writer suggests that the reason for this
situation is that in Italy the father dominates the family in a traditional
patriarchal manner. Granting the fact, however, that such a familial system might in some manner control the illegal behavior of juveniles, it would
also seem reasonable to suspect that the same family constellation might
also lead to a society in which totalitarian (i.e., father-like) governments
would find more hospitable soil, and in which a wide range of similar social
ills might eventuate. Certainly, in a balance of values, susceptibility to
totalitarian domination is a more unacceptable social prospect than delinquency, presuming that both might be related to the same social phenomena.
The moral is clear: Our aim is not only to inhibit delinquent behavior but
WPLATO, PRO'rAGORAS 324

(Jowett trans. 196).
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also to do so within the bounds of policies which do not, while they are
suppressing delinquency, produce social ailments or problems of a different but more serious order. No one would likely maintain, for instance,
that it is desirable to torment a child to the point of psychosis in order
to train him to behave and to inhibit his delinquent tendencies. It is a
balance of some form that we wish to achieve, and balances among varying
values are almost always difficult, uncertain, and precarious. Easy answers
in this field tend to be shallow and superficial answers.
In terms of the publication of the names of delinquents, the deterrent
effect on those not yet delinquent would appear to take the form of an apprehension on their part that similar anti-social behavior would result in
their unveiling before those upon whom they rely for emotional satisfaction
and support. The prospect of the withdrawal of such support constitutes
the deterrent. Such a vista will obviously not be effective with juveniles
who will be acclaimed for their publicized feats. Under such conditions, we
would submit the thesis that juveniles who will behave only because of the
prospect of scorn in the event of misbehavior, will almost always behave
just as well without such a prospect before them. In such instances, effective deterrence against delinquency has been built into their very being.
If correct, this view would insist that a policy of publication of the
names of juvenile felons will further deter those who would not have been
delinquent in any event. On the other hand, such a program will likely
have no effect, unless such effect be in the direction of stimulating delinquency, on those moving toward delinquent behavior.
In terms of individual deterrence-that is, the control of delinquency
committed by the person who offends and finds himself written up in the
papers-the evidence all points in a single direction, and that direction is
contrary to the underlying principle in the Montana statute. The view
that the publication of their names and information concerning them plays
directly into the hands of a large number of delinquents receives confirmation from many sources. If a considerable segment of delinquency is conceived theoretically as a lower-class attempt to achieve benefits offered
ubiquitously to all segments of the society,' then publicity, ironic as it might
appear, may be viewed as a form of social recognition, a recognition somewhat hostile and grudging on the part of the upper echelons of the society,
but replete with outright admiration when accorded by the delinquent's
peers. In support of this thesis, evidence can be brought together from
reports by, in the order in which they appear below, the police, a newspaper reporter commenting on gangs, a delinquent, a psychiatrist, a law
professor, and an adult convict:
1. Seven teen-agers arrested here [Paris, France] for staging
a street fight explained that they didn't mean to cause any trouble. They just wanted to get their pictures in the papers, police
reported today.'
2. When the crimes of their peers are reported in gory detail
some, inevitably, desire to imitate these deeds. More than once a
'See

For a review of
CLOWARD & OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY (1960).
current theories of delinquency, see BLOCH & Gis, MAN, CRIME, AND SOCIETY, ch.
14 (1962).

"United Press Internat'l, July 7, 1959.
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gang has launched a rumble or created a disturbance in the schools
"to make the headlines." Some New York newspapers publish
daily play-by-play reports of street warfare. Some radio stations
broadcast every line of teen-age violence they can lay their hands
on. These reports are avidly absorbed by street youngsters. Publicity has become part of the "rep" of the gang.'
3. Later, after I had been in the Detention Home many times,
the kids would flock around me and wanted to be my friends. I
had a reputation because I had been in there so many times, had
escaped from the place, and my escapades had been written up in
the newspapers. Naturally, my reputation was made as a big guy
as far as the kids were concerned. I had a bad influence upon
the younger kids, just the way the older kids had been when I was
in the Home the first time. I talked to them, gave them advice
on delinquency, and of course, they listened to me because of my
reputation.!
4. Everyone likes to see his name in print and exhibitionist
types, from whom many delinquents are drawn, do so in particular;
and it would be a most interesting experiment to ban all dramatic
descriptions of crime from the newspapers, confining reports to
brief and unsensational accounts.'
5. A factor of tremendous importance, too, is the publicity
given in our newspapers to an accused person. It is no answer to
say that to a normal person it would be unpleasant publicity. To
the accused it may be highly gratifying and eagerly sought for and
highly valued.'
6. Many of us [convicts] are like Pete, demanding attention,
doing nearly anything to get it. Often from broken homes, we
are . .. able to thrive gloriously for weeks on even the slightest
word of praise or any kind of notice. Most of us have scrapbooks
containing clippings in which we are mentioned.'
To those juveniles who do not take enthusiastically to the publicity,
ensuing shame and humiliation also seems unlikely to produce conforming
behavior. In addition, several other undesirable results might be effectuated. The "punishment" involved in publication could conceivably provide a relief from guilt so that the cycle of delinquent behavior could be
resumed. Work opportunities, considered important in inhibiting delinquency, could be dried up as the juvenile became notorious in the community. If juvenile delinquency is a hostile reaction and a response to fear,
then publication would increase that fear. Finally, if shame is related to
delinquency in any fashion, and this seems a likely hypothesis, statutes such
"SALISBURY, SHOOK-UP GENERATION 164 (1958).
"SHAW, BROTHERS IN CRIME 334 (1938).
61NEUSTATTER, PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER AND CRIME

221 (1953).

(1953).
ExpOsURES 73 (1959). Note also the actions of a would-be-murderer,
a juvenile, who wrote the Louisville Times: "I want full and complete coverage
in your newspaper." Bindner, I'll Kill You, in ETCHED IN MURDER 63-64 (Jones ed.
1959), and see further COHEN, CHILDREN IN TROUBLE 73 (1953), for report of a
juvenile in detention who wanted three different newspapers each day so as to be

WPuTTKAMmER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 16
'NEEsE, PRISON

able to follow stories of his exploits, as well as 21 FED. PROB. 76 (Dec. 1957), for
a statement by King's County Judge Samuel S. Liebowitz that publicity "makes
heroes" of delinquents.
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as that found in Montana would likely accentuate the original shame." Delinquents do not in most cases appear to steal because they are impoverished,
but because they have come to define their state as undesirable and, perhaps, shameful. Taylor provides historical support for the thesis that
humiliation may be more devastating than seemingly harsher punishment
with the observation that infanticide increased notably in Scotland when
adulterers and fornicators were punished by having to appear in church
each week for six months or a year to be harangued by the minister.
"Women who had illegitimately become pregnant preferred to risk the
capital penalty for infanticide rather than admit the facts and suffer such
extreme public humiliation," he notes.' Even were publication to deter
a number of juveniles through the operation of a process of humiliation,
any decision on the employment of such an approach must comprehend its
total impact. As the director of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency has noted in response to demands for harsher treatment of all
juvenile offenders: "We treat our wild life better than that. You are
not allowed to kill all the fish in a river to get a few carp, or to poison a
whole feeding area to destroy a few hawks. "' These possible detrimental
effects deriving from a publication statute must be taken into account in
evaluating such a statute.
CONCLUSION
The legal question concerning the publication of the names of juvenile
felons is closely tied to the stipulations of the Sixth Amendment and its
guarantee of the right to a public trial. Increasingly, this right is being
recognized as that of the defendant, though it would seem essential that
some elements of the right be preserved so that judicial proceedings do not
retreat totally beyond public gaze and the potential corrective of public
opinion. It seems highly desirable, for instance, that juvenile courts always remain open to at least some representatives of the public at large,
and newspapers appear to fill this position admirably. Public trial, however, should not be confused with the right of the press to name those involved in all forms of judicial business. Numerous laws protect the privacy
of individuals either as an abstract value or on the ground that such privacy
furthers ends conceived to be in the public interest.
The question of the publication of the names of juvenile felons most
basically comes down to a question of the interaction among social, political,
and legal values. The blending of these diverse considerations in judicial
affairs is neither unusual nor unwarranted. Justice Brennan of the
Supreme Court has urged lawyers to "turn their minds to the knowledge
and experience in particular of those disciplines that investigate and report
on the functioning and the nature of our society,"" while Justice Brandeis
quoted with approval the observation that "a lawyer who has not studied
economics and sociology is very apt to become a public enemy. "
"Appreciation is due Michael Silverman, Los Angeles State College student, for a
brief survey of the literature on delinquency to determine how various theoretical
positions were related to the question of publicity.

6TAYLOR, SEX IN HISTORW

166 (1954).

'Rector, An Age of Reason for the Juvenile Court, 8 CR ME & DELINQ. 2 (1962).
"N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1958.

'Brandeis, The Living Law, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESs 325 (1935). See also Gels,
Sociology, Criminology, and Criminal Law, 7 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 40 (1959).
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The material presented above indicates the paucity of clearcut, unimpeachable data upon which to base a definitive judgment concerning the
relationship between the publication of the names of juvenile felons and
the impact of this policy upon their behavior." What material is available
does seem to indicate, however, that a policy of unfettered publication of
the names of juvenile felons may very likely cause more social and individual harm than it eliminates. Certainly, in terms of the general spirit
of the juvenile court movement, and in terms of the implications of correctional policies current today, publication as an instrument of deterrence
seems to lack many redeeming features. In the absence of convincing evidence of the utility of such a policy, it would seem that the Montana statute
might well be re-examined closely and that, on the basis of such re-examination, a more desirable program might perhaps be substituted in its place.
In this respect, it does not seem inappropriate to repeat the observations
of Winston Churchill, addressing the House of Commons in 1910 when he
was Home Secretary.
The mood and temper of the public with regard to the treatment of
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country. A calm, dispassionate recognition of the
rights of the accused,.., a constant heart searching by all charged
with the duty of punishment-a desire and eagerness to rehabilitate
in the world of industry those who have paid their due; tireless
efforts toward the discovery of curative and regenerative processes; unfailing faith that there is a treasure if you can find it,
in the heart of every man. These are the symbols which in the
treatment of crime and criminal, mark and measure the stored up
strength of a nation, and are sign and proof of the living virtue
in it.0 '

'The difficulty of research on delinquency, and the absence of the most basic facts
should not be overlooked. Note, for instance, that "reporting on juvenile delinquency court cases from Montana has been, very erratic and incomplete. We have
received no data that would be of help to you in determining delinquency rates in
Montana in general. . . ." Letter from the Chief, Juvenile Delinquency Studies
Branch, Dept. of Health, Education, & Welfare, Feb. 16, 1962.
0
7Quoted in SiZE, PRIsoNs I HAVE KNOWN 62-63 (1957).
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